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Widening the Power Gap: The Eighth
Circuit’s Stringent Requirements for Class
Actions in Environmental Contamination
Cases
Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017)
Emily Holtzman*

I. INTRODUCTION
Pipeline construction is booming in the United States, yet it remains a
polarizing topic for many because of environmental concerns. On the one
hand, pipelines bring increased energy independence for the United States
and are one of the safest ways to transport oil and gas.1 At the same time,
fears of environmental damage have led to a growing and fierce opposition to
pipeline construction.2 After the massive offshore rig spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010, resistance to new projects like the Keystone Pipeline has
received widespread media coverage. The protests of the Dakota Access
Pipeline on the Standing Rock Reservation, in particular, portrayed how high
tensions have risen over pipeline construction.3 As quieter protests continue
across the country against various new and old pipeline constructions and
spills, questions about liability and accountability of the oil industry in the
future of environmental degradation have largely been left unanswered.4

* B.A., University of Missouri 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2020; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020. I would like to
thank Professor Rigel Oliveri for her guidance and support during the writing of this
Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review editorial staff for their assistance in editing.
1. See Charles Hughes, America Needs More Pipelines, U.S. NEWS (July 20,
2017),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2017-0720/america-needs-more-pipelines-to-transport-oil-and-gas-safely.
2. See id.
3. See e.g., Justin Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline
Protests, TIME (Oct. 28, 2016), http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipelinestanding-rock-sioux/.
4. Madeline Fitch, The Quiet but Furious War Against Pipelines, VICE (Oct. 11,
2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8xjen4/the-quiet-but-furious-nationwidewar-against-pipelines.
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In 2013, a portion of the Pegasus Pipeline5 (the “Pipeline”) ruptured
near Mayflower, Arkansas, spilling about 134,000 gallons of heavy crude oil
and forcing nearby residents to evacuate their homes.6 The Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) classified the leak as a “major spill.”7 Twentytwo homes were evacuated, and nearby wildlife was majorly affected for
years following the spill.8 Property owners with land subject to the easement
contracts with Exxon (“Plaintiffs”) brought a class action lawsuit against
Exxon Mobil Corporation, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, and Mobil Pipe
Line Company (collectively, “Exxon”) for breach of contract, alleging Exxon
operated the Pipeline in an unsafe and defective condition.9 In 2014, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified the class action;
however, on reconsideration in 2015, the court decertified the class.10 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed this decision in 2017.11
This Note argues this class should have been able to proceed to adjudicate its claims under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Eighth Circuit’s decision to decertify the class
in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp. will deprive property owners of control and
agency over their land when faced with environmental contamination or disaster resulting from the conduct of a large and powerful corporation. In light
of the massively uneven power dynamic that exists between pipeline operators and individual property owners across the country, removing class adjudication as a possibility to hold these operators liable for potential mistakes
further widens this power gap. Landowners, towns, municipalities, and residents should be aware of the repercussions of this decision in making future
5. The Pegasus Pipeline runs through properties in Texas, Arkansas, Missouri,
and Illinois and is subject to easement contracts in all of these states. Webb v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (8th Cir. 2017).
6. Id. at 1154; Exxon Shuts Oil Pipeline After “Major” Spill in Arkansas,
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/exxon-pipelinespill/exxon-shuts-oil-pipeline-after-major-pipeline-spill-in-arkansasidUSL2N0CN00720130331.
7. Reference News Release: U.S. Settles with ExxonMobil over Violations
Stemming from 2013 Oil Spill in Mayflower, Arkansas, EPA (Apr. 22, 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-news-release-us-settles-exxonmobilover-violations-stemming-2013-oil-spill [hereinafter Reference News Release].
8. Kristen Hays & Matthew Robinson, Exxon Cleans Up Arkansas Oil Spill;
Keystone
Plan
Assailed,
REUTERS
(Mar.
30,
2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-pipeline-spill/exxon-cleans-up-arkansasoil-spill-keystone-plan-assailed-idUSBRE92U00220130331.
9. Amended Complaint for Petitioners at 2, Webb, 856 F.3d 1150 (No. 4:13 CV
232 BSM), 2013 WL 9600153, ¶ 35.
10. Webb v. Exon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2014 WL 11498052, at
*5 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2014) (granting class certification in part); Webb v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2015 WL 11090403, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17,
2015), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017) (reconsidering class
certification, reversing, and granting defendant’s motion for summary judgement).
11. Webb, 856 F.3d 1150.
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agreements with pipeline owners and operators, as well as any industries or
facilities that carry major risks of environmental contamination.
Part II of this Note provides the facts and holding of Webb. Part III discusses the requirements of class action lawsuits under Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b) in light of Wal-Mart v. Dukes and other class action suits involving
environmental contamination claims. Part IV reviews the instant decision of
the Eighth Circuit in Webb. Part V explains why the Eighth Circuit adopted a
standard for certifying classes that is too stringent, even after Dukes, and further explains why the court erred in decertifying the class in Webb. Part VI
concludes this Note by explaining the impact this case will have on landowners and easement holders in the future.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Pipeline was constructed in 1947 and spans more than 650 miles
through Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, and Illinois.12 Magnolia, the corporate
predecessor of Exxon Mobil and the first owner of the Pipeline, entered into
easement contracts with property owners in these four states to build the
Pipeline alongside or across their properties.13 Magnolia used a low frequency electric resistance welding process to construct the Pipeline.14 This process of welding was replaced industry wide with a high-frequency welding
process in the 1970s after finding the low resistance construction was more
susceptible to corrosion, cracks, and bonding issues.15 At the time of the spill
in Mayflower, Exxon had upgraded approximately 200 miles of the original
pipe with a stronger welding process.16
The Pipeline was originally intended to transport crude oil from Texas
up through Illinois, traveling south to north, but in 2009, Exxon reversed the
flow of the oil while simultaneously increasing the amount of oil transported
by the Pipeline by fifty percent, totaling 95,000 barrels per day.17 Exxon
reversed the flow in order to transport tar sands, as opposed to the heavy
crude it had transported for the past fifty years.18 Reversing the flow and

12.
13.
14.
15.

Webb, 856 F.3d 1150 at 1153–54.
Id.
Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1, aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150.
Id.; Fact Sheet: Pipe Manufacturing Process, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSPipeManufacturingProcess.htm
(last updated Dec. 1, 2011).
16. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1.
17. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1154.
18. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1. Tar sands are a sticky deposit containing
bitumen (a type of petroleum that can be turned into fuel), and tar sands oil is much
heavier and more corrosive than crude. Melissa Denchak, What is the Keystone Pipeline?,
NAT’L
RESOURCE
DEF.
COUNCIL
(Apr.
7,
2017),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-keystone-pipeline.
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transporting a much heavier oil through the aging Pipeline led many to question if this was the direct cause of the 2013 spill in Mayflower.19
In April of 2013, Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Exxon,
claiming that Exxon breached the easement contracts by failing to maintain
and repair the Pipeline.20 Plaintiffs asked for relief in the form of “either (1)
rescission of the easement contracts and removal of the [P]ipeline from the[]
propert[ies], or (2) specific performance of the easement contract[s],” which
would have required Exxon to replace the entirety of the Pipeline.21 Alternately, Plaintiffs asked for compensatory damages for each class member if
the first two types of relief failed.22
Plaintiffs sought class certification under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule
23(b)(3).23 Two couples represented the class: Rudy F. and Betty Webb and
Arnez and Charletha Harper.24 Both couples owned real property subject to
the easement contracts – the Webbs in Mayflower, Arkansas, and the Harpers
in Conway, Arkansas.25 Plaintiffs estimated the size of the class to be in the
thousands and included “all persons and entities who owned real property as
of March 29, 2013, with an easement for the . . . Pipeline on their real property from Patoka[,] Illinois[,] to Corsicana, Texas.”26
Plaintiffs claimed Exxon materially breached the terms of the easements
under a “common course of corporate policy, pattern, practice and wrongful
conduct” by “failing to inspect, maintain, repair, and replace the [P]ipeline,
resulting in hazardous conditions and damages to the . . . servient estates.”27
Plaintiffs cited language in the form easement contracts stating that Magnolia
“hereby agree[d] to pay any damages that may arise to crops, timber, or fences from the use of said premises for such purposes.”28 Plaintiffs also asserted
19. See Nora Caplan-Bricker, This Is What Happens When a Pipeline Bursts in
Your
Town,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Nov.
18,
2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/115624/exxon-oil-spill-arkansas-2013-how-pipelineburst-mayflower. After the Mayflower spill and a spill that occurred in North Dakota
when the Pipeline’s flow was reversed, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration issued an advisory to pipeline operators with safety guidelines for
reversing the flow of pipelines. See generally DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, PIPELINE
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, PIPELINE SAFETY: GUIDANCE
FOR PIPELINE FLOW REVERSALS, PRODUCT CHANGES AND CONVERSION TO SERVICE
(2014),
https://www.pipelinelaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/24/2014/09/Advisory_re_Flow_Reversals.pdf.
The advisory
notes that reversal can impact pipeline function and lead to spills. See id. at 2.
20. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1154, 1158.
21. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1.
22. See Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 18.
23. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1.
24. Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 3–4.
25. Id. Neither couple suffered property damage as a result of the 2013 spill in
Mayflower. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1.
26. Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 13–14.
27. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1154.
28. Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 17–18.
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that Exxon, as the holder of the easement, had an affirmative duty to maintain
the property but breached this duty by operating the Pipeline in an “unsafe,
defective, and unreasonably dangerous condition.”29 By breaching this duty,
Plaintiffs ultimately alleged Exxon’s breach of the easement contracts “create[d] an immediate zone of danger to the[m] . . . and class members who
have the Pipeline on their property pursuant to an easement.”30

A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification
In 2014, The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3), finding Plaintiffs established the predominance requirement and that granting class certification was the superior
method for litigating these claims to reduce “costs and the use of judicial
resources.”31 The court found certification under Rule 23(b)(2) improper,
reasoning that neither of the remedies that Plaintiffs’ sought for their sole
breach of contract claim – “rescission of the easement contract or specific
performance” – were “tantamount to the injunctive relief that must be asserted in order to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.”32 In light of this reasoning, the court denied certification under Rule 23(b)(2), instead finding certification under Rule 23(b)(3) proper for the claims Plaintiffs brought.33
The Eastern District found Plaintiffs met the numerosity requirement
under Rule 23(a)(1) because the Pipeline spanned 650 miles, making joinder
of all Plaintiffs impracticable.34 The Eastern District further concluded Plaintiffs satisfied commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) because their claims presented common questions of law or fact – specifically whether Exxon failed to
operate and maintain the Pipeline properly and whether this breached the
easement contracts.35 The court also found Plaintiffs satisfied typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) because their claims stemmed from “Exxon’s operation of
the [P]ipeline.”36 To properly satisfy the requirement of adequacy under Rule
23(a)(4), the court removed the Webbs as class representatives because even
though their property was subject to an easement, the Pipeline did not actually touch the Webbs’ property.37
Exxon contended, in part, the definition of the class was too broad because it could include property owners who sold their property prior to the

29. Id.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4–5 (finding that Plaintiffs produced com-

mon evidence to show that common issues predominated on a “systematic, class-wide
basis” and was “sufficiently cohesive”).
32. Id. at *4.
33. Id. at *5.
34. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
35. Id. at *3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
36. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
37. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
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spill of 2013.38 In response to this, the Eastern District, sua sponte, narrowed
the class definition to include “all persons and entities who currently own real
property subject to an easement for the . . . Pipeline and who have pipeline
physically crossing their property from Patoka, Illinois to Corsicana, Texas.”39 The court determined Exxon’s other arguments in support of its motion
to dismiss were better suited as defenses to present in the course of litigation
and not as proper grounds for dismissal or for decertifying the class.40

B. Exxon’s Motion for Reconsideration and Summary Judgment
After the Eastern District granted class certification in 2014, Exxon motioned for reconsideration and summary judgment.41 At this reconsideration
hearing, the court granted both motions.42 In determining Plaintiffs did not
actually meet the requirement for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), the court
viewed the Pipeline as “a series of individual segments, with each segment
corresponding to each individual landowner.”43 The court reasoned that if the
Pipeline spilled in one place, it would have no real effect on a property owner
subject to the Pipeline easement in a different state and that, because of this,
Plaintiffs could not meet the commonality requirement.44 The court further
held Plaintiffs could not satisfy the typicality requirement because to prove
Exxon breached its easement contracts, the court would need to conduct an
“individualized inquiry” into each property to resolve the claims.45 Because
Plaintiffs could not meet these requirements, the court found they similarly
could not meet the requirement of adequacy and decertified the class.46
Another issue the court faced was the potential of invoking conflicting
state property laws if Plaintiffs prevailed on their claims.47 Exxon and Plaintiffs disagreed about easement law in the four states the Pipeline ran through,
with Plaintiffs arguing the laws were the same and Exxon arguing they differed substantially.48 The court, agreeing with Exxon, found Arkansas law
was unique compared to the other states because Arkansas law defines ease38. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *3.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. (arguing that the pipe had been repaired in certain locations, so property

owners in those locations and others not in Mayflower suffered no injury).
41. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2015 WL 11090403,
at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir.
2017).
42. Id.
43. Id. at *3.
44. Id. (“[S]imply because Exxon may not be fulfilling its duties on one person’s
land does not necessarily mean it is not fulfilling its duties on all landowners’ property.”).
45. Id. (citing Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 787 (8th Cir. 2006)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at *4.
48. Id.
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ments solely as granting a right of way with no affirmative duty to repair or
maintain the easement.49 Therefore, the court held a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs would create a potential problem of applying inconsistent state laws and
granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon.50
The court declined to determine if class certification was appropriate
under Rule 23(b)(2), citing to its previous discussion that Plaintiffs’ claims
did not appropriately fall under the injunctive requirement of a Rule 23(b)(2)
class.51

C. Plaintiffs’ Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit
On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the Eastern District’s decision to decertify the class and grant summary judgment in favor of Exxon.52 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the Eastern District’s decision to decertify the class and grant
summary judgment in favor of Exxon.53 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the
Eastern District’s conclusion that because Exxon operated the Pipeline as
individual segments, Plaintiffs could not meet the commonality requirement
under Rule 23(a).54 The Eighth Circuit found that even if it came to the alternate conclusion that Exxon operated the Pipeline as one segment, the injury
Plaintiffs suffered was not the same because “establishing breach would require examination of how Exxon’s operation of the [P]ipeline affects . . .
[P]laintiffs, which . . . varies depending on where the individual class members’ property is located.”55 The Eighth Circuit concluded that because Plaintiffs could not meet the commonality requirement, they consequently could
not meet the “far more demanding” predominance requirement under Rule
23(b)(3) because “individual issues [of class members] predominate over
common ones.”56
In finding the Eastern District did not abuse its discretion by decertifying the class, the Eighth Circuit echoed the Eastern District’s concern about
the potential conflicting state laws arising under the contract, property, and
tort claims Plaintiffs proposed.57 The Eighth Circuit hinged its reasoning on
the fact that, under Arkansas property law, Exxon had no affirmative duty to
repair or maintain the Pipeline as a term of the easement contracts.58 There-

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 1156.
Id.
Id. at 1156–57.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 10

544

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

fore, the Eighth Circuit found no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Exxon breached the easement contracts.59
Because the Eighth Circuit determined Exxon had no affirmative duty to
repair the Pipeline, it further held Plaintiffs could not show they suffered the
same injury to meet either the commonality or predominance requirements.60
The court was also concerned class litigation was not the superior method for
litigating these claims because determining injury of Plaintiffs in the class in
this case would require individual assessments of each Plaintiff’s property.61
The Eighth Circuit affirmed class decertification, holding that where members of a proposed class have suffered individualized injuries, the class cannot meet the requirements for commonality and predominance under Rule
23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).62

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because the legal questions presented in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp. focus on issues of class certification, this Part will begin with an overview and
discussion of the relevant Rules. This Part then will analyze various environmental contamination cases where classes were both certified and decertified.

A. Class Certification
Under Rule 23(a), members of a class action must meet four requirements, commonly referred to as (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.63 The requirement of numerosity is simply that the
class of plaintiffs must be so large that joinder of all plaintiffs would be impracticable.64 The commonality requirement requires a class to show that
“questions of law or fact common to the class” exist.65 To meet the typicality requirement, class representatives must show their claims or defenses are
“typical of the claims of defenses of the class”; such a showing ensures the
class representatives are members of the class and will pursue the class mem-

59. Id.
60. Id. at 1157 (“[P]laintiffs here may assert all of the pipe for 850 miles is bad,

but demonstrating breach is more complicated.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1156–57.
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). While the Rules do not specify an exact number of
plaintiffs that meet the numerosity requirement, it is typically apparent whether or not
a proposed class meets this requirement, and numerosity determinations are rarely
challenged. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:12, West
(database updated Nov. 2018).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
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bers’ claims.66 The final requirement of adequacy requires the class representatives to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”67
Once the class meets these four requirements, it must seek certification
within one of the categories under Rule 23(b):
(1) Prosecuting separate actions would result in inconsistent or varying
adjudications;
(2) Injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a
whole;
(3) The common questions of law or fact predominate over any individual issues of members of the class, and therefore class action is the
superior method for adjudicating the claims.68

Typically, classes seeking money damages must seek certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) because many courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have held that Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) class adjudications are
not proper for classes seeking individualized money damages.69
Prior to 2011, the standard for meeting the commonality requirement
under Rule 23(a)(2) was not a difficult one to meet.70 However, the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Wal-Mart v. Dukes made this requirement
more stringent.71 In Dukes, a proposed class of current and former female
employees of Wal-Mart brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, alleging Wal-Mart discriminated against female employees on
the basis of sex.72 This class of 1.5 million current and past Wal-Mart employees was one of “the most expansive class actions ever.”73 Plaintiffs argued class certification was appropriate to adjudicate these claims because,
while Wal-Mart did not have an “express corporate policy” against women,
the strong “corporate culture” of the operation of the stores had a disparate
impact on all of its female employees.74 The U.S. District Court for the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 64, at § 3:28.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3).
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011).
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating
that this requirement has been construed “permissively”); Mullen v. Treasure Chest
Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the test for commonality is “not demanding”).
71. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350.
72. Id. at 342–43.
73. Id. at 342.
74. Id. at 344–45.
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Northern District of California certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2),75 and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed with a 6-5 vote.76
The United States Supreme Court, in a decision that changed the future
of class action litigation, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and decertified
the class.77 Justice Antonin G. Scalia, writing for the majority, held it is not
enough for members of a class to show they have “all suffered a violation of
the same provision of law”; they must also show their claims “depend upon a
common contention.”78 Plaintiffs must show this “common contention” to be
“capable of classwide resolution” in that the “truth or falsity [of the claims]
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke.”79 Because so many of the discriminatory employment practices
the class alleged were left to the discretion of lower level managers, plaintiffs
did not sufficiently establish a “common mode of exercising discretion that
pervade[d] the entire company.”80 As a result, the Court held the class did
not satisfy the commonality requirement because it failed to establish a common contention capable of classwide resolution.81 Justice Scalia further
agreed with Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion,
stating the class members in this case had “little in common but their sex and
this lawsuit.”82
Dukes has significantly changed the course of class action lawsuits.83
Prior to Dukes, a proposed class could satisfy the commonality requirement
by establishing a single common question.84 While the Court in Dukes did
not specifically reject this previous standard for satisfying commonality, the

75. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 188 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d
by Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d by 564 U.S.
338 (2011).
76. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d by 564
U.S. 338 (2011). Judge Hawkins delivered the majority opinion joined by Judges
Reinhardt, Fisher, Paez, and Berzon; Judge Graber concurred; Judge Ikuta dissented
and was joined by Judges Kozinski, Rymer, Silverman, and Bea. Id.
77. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359 (holding that the class could not alternatively be
certified under Rule 23(b)(3)).
78. Id. at 350.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 356.
81. Id. at 357 (“Merely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.”).
82. Id. at 360 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
83. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
729, 774–75 (2013).
84. See Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3d. Cir. 1994) (“[C]lass members can assert
such a single complaint even if they have not all suffered actual injury; demonstrating
that all class members are subject to the same harm will suffice.” (alteration in original)).
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Court held the class could not satisfy this requirement without “convincing
proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy.”85
Closely related to the requirement of commonality is that of predominance, which is required for classes seeking certification under Rule
23(b)(3).86 Rule 23(b)(3) certification differs slightly from the other categories of class certification because it was “designed to expand class action
practice to include new categories of cases where class treatment ‘would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.’”87 In Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor,88 the United States Supreme Court held the predominance
requirement is meant to test “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation” to determine if “common
questions ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.’”89 To determine whether a class is “sufficiently cohesive,” the Court
has differentiated between common and individual questions by looking at
the evidence necessary to prove the claims.90 If at least one issue common to
the class predominates over the individual issues, the class action is proper
under Rule 23(b)(3).91
Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) has a similar requirement of cohesion among class members, but claims falling under this category typically
must be for injunctive or declaratory relief.92 In Dukes, the Court explained
the class was not an appropriate Rule 23(b)(2) class because plaintiffs were
seeking individualized monetary damages.93 The Court declined to make a
definitive statement as to whether classes seeking monetary damages can ever
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) but did find that “at a minimum, claims for
individualized relief . . . do not satisfy the Rule.”94 The Court reasoned this
type of relief is inappropriate because “[t]he key to the [Rule 23](b)(2) class
is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted –
the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’”95
85. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359.
86. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997) (“[Q]uestions

of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members.”).
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment).
88. 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997).
89. Id. at 593–94.
90. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (stating that
individual questions require evidence that varies between members of the class, while
common questions require the same evidence for each member).
91. Id. at 1045.
92. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
93. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361–62.
94. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
95. Id.
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The requirement of cohesion among class members and the relief sought
is closely related in a Rule 23(b)(2) class.96 The Court has found that to
prove cohesion a class can demonstrate “the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.”97 The
Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules further explain Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate when “[a]ction or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning
of this subdivision even if it has taken effect or is threatened only as to one or
a few members of the class, provided it is based on grounds which have general application to the class.”98
A problem courts often run into when determining if class certification
is appropriate is the line between inquiries of class certification and determination of the merits of the class members’ claims.99 In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds,100 the Court clarified that a class
does not need to demonstrate it will prevail on the merits of its claims in order to meet the requirements of class certification. The Court further explained that for a class seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the class
must show “questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.”101 In Amgen, a
class of plaintiffs brought claims against Amgen, a biotechnology company,
for securities fraud and asked for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).102
Plaintiffs alleged Amgen made misrepresentations and misleading omissions
that affected its stock price, causing economic injury to the proposed class.103
Amgen argued the class could not meet the predominance requirement under
Rule 23(b)(3) because it failed to prove Amgen’s conduct “materially” affected the stock price, which was an element of the cause of action plaintiffs
brought.104 The court rejected this argument for two reasons: (1) materiality
is an objective inquiry that can be proved “through evidence common to the
class,” and (2) failure to prove materiality would not result in individual questions predominating over questions common to the class.105 Because the
Court found the class alleged a “fatal similarity” among class members,
therefore satisfying predominance, the claims would be best addressed at a

96. See id. (“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.”).
97. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment).
99. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465–
66 (2013).
100. Id. at 466 (“Rule 23 grants no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.”).
101. Id. at 459 (alteration in original).
102. Id. at 458–59.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 466.
105. Id. at 467–68.
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trial or on a motion for summary judgment rather than at the class certification stage.106
The Court has also recognized that the line between class certification
inquiries and inquiries into the merits of the claims is not always easy to determine.107 In Dukes, in determining if the proposed class met the commonality requirement, the Court found that proving commonality “necessarily”
overlapped with the merits of plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination
because these claims involved understanding the reasoning behind employment decisions.108 While it is ideal for courts to separate the inquiries into
class certification and determination of the merits, the Court has acknowledged this line is often blurred.

B. Environmental Contamination Claims
Class action lawsuits often provide a vehicle for plaintiffs to recover for
property damage or physical illness resulting from environmental contamination caused by negligent practices or clean-up efforts by corporations and
industries. The federal circuit courts have typically handled these claims
differently, with some using a more plaintiff-friendly approach than others.

1. Successful Class Certification in the Fifth Circuit: Deepwater Horizon Litigation
In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig exploded in the Gulf of
Mexico, killing eleven people and causing the worst oil spill in American
history, which lasted almost three months.109 Thousands of plaintiffs brought
claims against BP, the owners and operators of the rig, for property damage,
and these were consolidated in one class action in 2012.110 After the class
was certified by the Eastern District of Louisiana, the class reached a settlement with BP.111 On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
seeking approval of settlement of the class members’ claims, objectors to the
settlement argued the class should not have been certified because it “include[d] persons who have not actually been injured” and therefore failed to

106. Id. at 470–71.
107. Id. at 465–66 (“[W]e have cautioned that a court’s class-certification analysis

must be ‘rigorous’ and may ‘entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s
underlying claim . . . .’”).
108. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011).
109. Chad Bray, BP to Take $1.7 Billion Charge Over Deepwater Horizon Spill,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/business/dealbook/bp-oil-spill-deepwaterhorizon.html.
110. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub nom. In
re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014).
111. Id. at 901, 914–17, 921–25.
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satisfy the commonality requirement.112 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument.113 In discussing the “common contention” requirement set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Dukes, the Fifth Circuit held this “contention
need not relate specifically to the damages component of the class members’
claims” and the “requirement that class members have all ‘suffered the same
injury’ can be satisfied by an instance of the defendant’s injurious conduct.”114
The Fifth Circuit further explained that a district court does not need to
address the merits of the class members’ claims in order to certify the
class.115 Because, as the Court determined in Dukes, Rule 23 does not set
forth a “mere pleading standard,” the Fifth Circuit explained that even if a
class needs to provide evidence to establish a common contention for purposes of satisfying commonality, a district court does not need to determine if the
contention is “correct” to certify the class.116 The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed class certification in Deepwater Horizon, finding questions about
whether BP was negligent or could have prevented the massive spill, whether
BP acted timely in stopping the spill, and whether BP had a valid defense
were all common questions that were “central to the validity of all the class
members’ claims.”117

2. Class Decertification in the Eighth Circuit: Smith and Ebert
The outcome of Dukes and its heightened standard for meeting the
commonality requirement have impacted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit’s willingness to certify classes, especially in cases involving
claims for environmental damage.118 In Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line
Co.,119 the defendant (“Phillips”) owned a pipeline that spilled in West Alton, Missouri, in 1963. After the spill, the site of contamination was not
properly remediated, and in 2002, nearby property owners discovered contaminants in their soil from this spill.120 Two separate classes formed and
brought claims against Phillips, the first seeking injunctive relief and damages for its nuisance claims and the second seeking compensation for medical
monitoring as a result of potential exposure to the contaminants.121 The U.S.
112.
113.
114.
115.

In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 808, 810.
Id. at 810.
Id. (citing Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)).
Id. at 811 (“There is no need to resolve the merits of the common contention
at the Rule 23 stage . . . .”).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017); Ebert
v. General Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2016); Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe
Line Co., 801 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2015).
119. Smith, 801 F.3d at 922.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 923.
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District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri certified only the first class,
but the Eighth Circuit decertified the class on appeal.122
The Eighth Circuit decertified the class because plaintiffs could not
show they were commonly affected by the contamination and accordingly
could not meet the commonality requirements under Rule 23(a)(2).123 Because plaintiffs could not all prove the contamination affected, or even
touched, each class member’s land, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Phillips
that “absent the injury of actual contamination . . . plaintiffs cannot meet the
Rule 23 requirements of commonality or typicality” because they failed to
prove a “classwide injury.”124 In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit
further held “fear of contamination . . . [was] not a sufficient injury to support
a claim for common law nuisance in the absence of proof.”125
In Ebert v. General Mills, Inc.,126 the defendant (“General Mills”)
owned an industrial facility in the Como neighborhood of Minneapolis. For
about fifteen years, General Mills dumped as much as one thousand gallons
of hazardous waste in the ground at the facility.127 After working with the
EPA to clean up the land, remnants of the hazardous waste were found in the
soil vapor of the Como neighborhood in 2013.128 Residents brought a class
action suit against General Mills for “threatening home and business owners”
in the area and decreasing property values.129 After the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota certified the class, the Eighth Circuit reversed,
finding the district court abused its discretion in determining the class satisfied the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).130
Finding the class did not meet the predominance requirement, the court
emphasized that allowing the class to proceed would “require an inquiry into
the causal relationship between the actions of General Mills and the resulting
alleged vapor contamination” and that this type of inquiry was not “suitable
for class-wide determination.”131 The court acknowledged that questions
common to the class existed, and while this might have been enough for the
class to meet Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement, the analysis under
Rule 23(b)(3) of common questions is one that is “qualitative rather than
quantitative.”132 Because the court determined class members would need to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 925, 927.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 927.
Ebert v. General Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 479.
Id. (“To resolve liability there must be a determination as to whether vapor
contamination, if any, threatens or exists on each individual property as a result of
General Mills’ actions, and, if so, whether that contamination is wholly, or actually
attributable to General Mills . . . .”).
132. Id. at 478.
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produce individual evidence of their injuries, the court found that individual
questions of the class predominated over issues common to the class.133 The
court decertified the class on these grounds, finding the individual inquiries
necessary to determining liability made this case “not suitable for class-wide
determination.”134
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Deepwater Horizon, the
Eighth Circuit in Smith and Ebert placed greater focus on the injuries suffered
by plaintiffs seeking class certification in determining whether the proposed
classes met the requirements of commonality and predominance.135 In
Deepwater Horizon, the Fifth Circuit instead focused on the question the
class raised regarding BP’s conduct to find the class met the requirements of
commonality and predominance.136

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit decertified the class in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
for failing to meet the requirements under Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).137
This decision centered mainly on the commonality and predominance requirements under Rule 23 and whether there was a genuine issue of material
fact regarding the class members’ claim that Exxon breached the easement
contracts.138 This Part discusses the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that the
claims Plaintiffs brought were not proper for a class action.

A. Decertifying the Class
The Eighth Circuit decertified the class because Plaintiffs could not
meet the requirements for commonality and predominance under Rule
23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).139 With the understanding that Exxon operated
the Pipeline as “individual segments,” the court determined Plaintiffs could
not prove a common contention because “Exxon’s actions, or inactions, on
one individual’s land would not necessarily implicate the interests of other
landowners.”140 Because of this, the court stated that even if Exxon did operate the entirety of the Pipeline in the same way, the effect of this on each

133. Id. at 479.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 481; Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 927 (8th

Cir. 2015).
136. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 818 (5th Cir. 2014).
137. 856 F.3d 1150, 1156–57 (8th Cir. 2017).
138. Id. at 1155–56.
139. Id. at 1156–57.
140. Id. at 1156 (quoting Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM
WL 11090403, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2015)).
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class member would still be different because of the varied nature of the individual properties and easement contracts.141
The Eighth Circuit used a similar analysis of the claims to determine
Plaintiffs could not meet the “far more demanding” requirement of predominance under Rule 23(b)(3).142 Because Exxon operated the Pipeline as separate units, unique to each piece of property the Pipeline touched, the court
found that determining liability in this case would have required an assessment of each property to determine what injury each Plaintiff suffered.143
Because of this, the Eighth Circuit found individual questions necessarily
predominated over issues common to the class.144

B. No Breach of Easement Contracts Under Arkansas Law
In addition to decertifying the class, the Eighth Circuit also granted
summary judgment in favor of Exxon because there was no issue of material
fact as to whether Exxon breached its easement contracts with Plaintiffs.145
The court stated that for Plaintiffs to show a breach in this case, “they must
demonstrate Exxon has failed to perform a duty.”146 Resting on its conclusion that under Arkansas law easement contracts do not give rise to a duty of
the easement holder to maintain or repair the easement, the court found Exxon did not breach its easement contracts with Plaintiffs.147
The Eighth Circuit applied the reasoning set forth in City of Crosett v.
Riles to reach its conclusion that easement contracts do not create an affirmative duty to repair or maintain under Arkansas law.148 While the court agreed
with Plaintiffs’ argument that easement holders have a duty to not interfere
with the “use and enjoyment” of the servient estate, Plaintiffs failed to establish this because their allegations of property damage were “vague” and failed
to show an actual physical injury.149 Even though this was a question of fact,
the Eighth Circuit found the evidence was so vague it was “insufficient to

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1156–57.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1156–57.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Webb, 856 F.3d at 1159; see also City of Crossett v. Riles, 549 S.W.2d 800
(1977) (regarding Plaintiffs with property subject to easements owned by the City
brought action against City for failing to maintain the easements, resulting in flooding). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 4.13(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(noting the “beneficiary of an easement” is required “to repair and maintain the portions of the servient estate” and to “prevent unreasonable interference with the servient estate”).
149. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1158–59.
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raise a genuine issue of material fact” and summary judgment for Exxon was
appropriate.150

V. COMMENT
This Part further discusses the Eighth Circuit’s decision to decertify the
class in Webb for failing to meet the commonality and predominance requirements under Rule 23. The Eastern District of Arkansas initially certified
the class in Webb under Rule 23(b)(3).151 This Part argues the court should
have originally certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2) but certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) was also appropriate.
Specifically, this Part argues a more preferable approach would have
been to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), but the Eastern District of Arkansas mistakenly found a claim for breach of contract does not fall under
injunctive relief for the purposes of class certification. This Part also argues
the Eighth Circuit inappropriately determined the merits of the claims when
deciding whether to certify the class and, for these reasons, the class should
have been allowed to proceed.

A. The Eastern District’s Failure to Certify the Class Under
Rule 23(b)(2)
After the Eastern District originally certified the class in Webb under
Rule 23(b)(3), the crux of this case on appeal became whether this class was
proper for Rule 23(b)(3) adjudication.152 However, the Eastern District and
the Eighth Circuit failed to recognize that class certification in this case under
Rule 23(b)(2) was not only proper but preferable to certification under Rule
23(b)(3).153
The two main requirements under a Rule 23(b)(2) class action are that
the class must be sufficiently cohesive and seeking injunctive or declaratory
relief.154 The Eastern District erroneously determined in its first class certification hearing that class certification was not proper under Rule 23(b)(2)
because Plaintiffs were seeking either rescission of the contracts or specific
performance, which are equitable remedies that the court determined were not
“tantamount to the injunctive relief that must be asserted.”155 This is plainly
incorrect given that equitable remedies, such as contract rescission, are by

150. Id. at 1159.
151. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2014 WL 11498052,

at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir.
2017).
152. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1157.
153. Id. at 1156–57.
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
155. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4.
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nature injunctive relief.156 The court cites to Dukes, where the United States
Supreme Court stated that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not speak of ‘equitable’ remedies generally but of injunctions and declaratory judgments.”157 However, in
the context of this quote, the Court determined the backpay the class in Dukes
was seeking was not injunctive or declaratory relief, as required by Rule
23(b)(2).158 This comparison is entirely different when determining if contract rescission and specific performance are forms of injunctive relief. While
the class in Dukes tried to argue backpay was an equitable remedy rather than
a monetary remedy, the Court was not convinced.159 In Webb, however, the
class sought rescission of the contracts or specific performance, which are
two remedies that squarely fall within the meaning of injunctive relief required by Rule 23(b)(2).
The class in Webb would have further met the requirement of cohesion
under Rule 23(b)(2) by showing Exxon acted on grounds “generally applicable to the class.”160 While the Eastern District and Eighth Circuit decided to
view the Exxon’s operation of the Pipeline as a series of separate units, this
understanding fails to consider the actual physical nature of the Pipeline.
Exxon’s decisions to maintain, or not maintain, the Pipeline on one person’s
land necessarily affected the status of the Pipeline on another person’s land
because the Pipeline was a singular physical entity connected from start to
finish. Further, Exxon sends the oil through the entirety of the Pipeline – not
just through individual segments.. The way the Pipeline connected all the
class members by nature of its physical presence on each class member’s
property would be enough to satisfy the cohesion requirement under Rule
23(b)(2) and present a common question of whether Exxon’s course of conduct amounted to a breach.161 It appears the class deliberately chose to bring
a breach of contract claim as opposed to a mass tort action162 because of the
way the breach of contract claim fits within the requirements of a Rule
23(b)(2) action. For these reasons, the class should have been certified under
Rule 23(b)(2).

156. See 11A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2941, West (database update Apr. 2019);
5 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 49:38, West (database updated Nov. 2018).
157. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4.
158. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 365 (2011).
159. See id.
160. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997).
161. See Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F.3d 426, 442
(7th Cir. 2015) (certifying a class of teachers who alleged discrimination by school
board under Rule 23(b)(2) and finding “the fact that the plaintiffs might require individualized relief does not preclude certification of a class for common equitable relief”).
162. Class certification is notoriously difficult to attain with mass tort claims.
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B. The Eighth Circuit’s Decision to Decertify the Class
Even though, in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., class certification would
have been preferable under Rule 23(b)(2), the Eighth Circuit’s decision not to
certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) was still flawed. In this ruling, the
Eighth Circuit adopted a stringent analysis of the commonality and predominance requirements compared to other federal circuit courts considering class
certification after Dukes.163 In concluding the class did not meet the commonality requirement, the court focused its reasoning on the question of
whether Plaintiffs all suffered the same injury.164 In Dukes, the Court held
that for class members to suffer the same injury for the purposes of class certification, it is not enough that they “have all suffered a violation of the same
provision of law.”165 The class members’ claims, the Court explained, must
depend upon a common contention that is capable of “classwide resolution.”166
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Deepwater Horizon was more favorable
to plaintiffs bringing claims arising from environmental contamination than
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Webb. In Deepwater Horizon, the Fifth
Circuit determined the common contention a class alleges does not need to
“relate specifically to the damages component of the class members’
claims.”167 The Eighth Circuit in Webb, however, focused on the damages
claims of class members in emphasizing determination of injury would require individual assessments of each class members’ land.168 Because of this,
the court reasoned, the claims of the class members did not rest upon a common contention.169 However, the injury the class suffered in Webb is much
more analogous to the injury the class suffered in Deepwater Horizon than in
Dukes. The class in Webb suffered injury because of a uniform practice by
Exxon of not maintaining or repairing the Pipeline while simultaneously
transporting double the amount of product through it in breach of the easement contracts.170 Just because the injury might have differed from property

163. See, e.g., Chi. Teachers Union, 797 F.3d at 440 (“The court need only resolve whether the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the
same kind of claims from all the class members.”); In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, 821 F.3d 410, 427 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven if players’ particular injuries are unique, their negligence and fraud claims still depend on
the same common questions regarding the NFL’s conduct.”).
164. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2017).
165. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
166. Id.
167. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 810 (5th Cir. 2014).
168. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1156–57.
169. Id. at 1156.
170. Id. at 1153. In Dukes, the Court found that individual questions predominated over questions common to the class because Wal-Mart did not have a uniform or
blanket practice of discrimination; the conduct in question came from thousands of
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to property does not change the fact that whether Exxon breached the easement contracts is a question common to all class members.171
In Amgen,172 the United States Supreme Court cautioned against determining the merits of a claim in the class certification process. While analyzing whether common questions of the class predominate, the Court acknowledged this can naturally lead to some crossover between certification and
assessing the merits.173 The Court stated the merits should only be considered to the extent necessary to determine predominance.174 Justice Ruth B.
Ginsberg, in the majority opinion, clarified, “Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions
will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.”175 Accordingly, a class
is not required to prove it will succeed on the merits in order to be certified.176
The Eighth Circuit hinged its decision that class certification was not
proper under Rule 23(b)(3) on the argument that Plaintiffs could not show a
common contention because Exxon operated the Pipeline as individual segments, and therefore, its operation of the Pipeline in one area would not affect
operation in another area.177 Not only does this argument fail as a practical
matter – because the Pipeline is by definition one physical entity – but this
conclusion illustrates that the Eighth Circuit engaged in the sort of “freeranging merits inquiries” that the Court warned against in Amgen.178 In fact,
the Eighth Circuit granted summary judgment to Exxon on the grounds that,
under Arkansas state property law, an easement holder has no implied duty to

supervisors at stores across the country who were given discretion in the hiring process. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 355–56.
171. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, 821 F.3d
410, 427 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that the class of retired professional football players
met the commonality requirement because the “NFL Parties allegedly injured retired
players through the same course of conduct” and rejecting the argument that the class
could not meet the commonality requirement because players’ suffered different injuries); see also Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Co-op, No. 11-cv-04321-NKL, 2013
WL 3872181, at *16 (W.D. Mo. 2013) (certifying a class of plaintiffs who owned
property subject to easements with electric company and brought claims against the
electric company for exceeding the scope of the easements; the court found that the
class met the commonality requirement because determining whether or not the electric company violated the easements was a question common to the class).
172. 568 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (“Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in
free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.”).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 466.
175. Id. at 459 (alteration in original).
176. Id.
177. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2017).
178. Amgen Inc., 568 U.S. at 466.
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repair or maintain the easement and therefore found Exxon could not have
breached the easement contracts.179

C. Future Impact
Class action litigation can provide an even playing field between individuals and powerful industries. Wealth and income status are necessarily
connected to class action litigation involving environmental contamination.
Property values are typically lower near industries and facilities likely to pollute or contaminate nearby lands, and those who are able to afford to live
elsewhere do.180 The Eighth Circuit, in its rulings in Webb, Ebert, and Smith,
has sent a clear message to property owners that class litigation of their
claims against big industry for environmental contamination will not proceed.
The Eighth Circuit effectively removed class action litigation as a tool for
shrinking the power gap between individuals affected by environmental contamination and the big industries that cause such contamination. The Eastern
District noted the issues Webb presents for class action litigation moving forward:
The difficulty with this case is that the decision-maker has to decide
between two objectionable options. If Exxon’s position prevails, the
message to easement grantors is that they are helpless in attempting to
avoid a pipeline oil spill, and have no rights until after the oil starts
spewing from the [P]ipeline. And, this does not seem fair. On the
other hand, if [P]laintiffs’ position prevails, easement grantors would
essentially be able to hold pipeline easement holders hostage, threatening them with lawsuits or contract rescission every time the easement grantors possess any notion that the companies are not meeting
the easement grantors’ personal safety standards. And, this appears to
be neither fair nor commercially acceptable.181

The court recognized this was essentially a losing fight but decided fairness to Exxon in this case trumped fairness to the class.182 Even where there
was a clear answer for the class to proceed, like certification under Rule
23(b)(2) in Webb, the Eighth Circuit still refused to allow Plaintiffs to bring
179. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1158 (citing City of Crossett v. Riles, 549 S.W.2d 800
(Ark. 1977)).
180. See Emmie Martin, 13 Things That Will Trash Your Home’s Value, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/factors-lower-home-value2016-11. But see Lemings v. Eastridge, No. 4:12CV00342 JLH, 2012 WL 12076464,
at *3 (E.D. Ark. 2013); Minyard v. Habbe, No. CA 00-1099, 2001 WL 1092818, at
*4 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
181. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2015 WL 11090403,
at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir.
2017).
182. See id.
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their claims. To better even out the playing field between individuals and big
industry, the Eighth Circuit should have allowed the class to proceed. Many
of the issues the Eighth Circuit grappled with in decertifying the class, like
whether Exxon breached the contracts, would have been better left to a fact
finder to determine.
Moving forward, states, especially those within the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction, should create more protections for residents affected by environmental contamination caused by big industry to help bridge the power gap.
While residents should maintain skepticism about pipeline construction, popular opposition to pipeline construction is only half the battle. Special attention should also be focused on pipeline companies’ right to use eminent domain to seize property for new construction.183
Allowing pipeline companies free range over land across the country
while courts refuse to allow the individuals who are or might become affected
by environmental contamination to bring their claims to court eliminates a
major check on the power of pipeline companies. While Exxon and BP were
forced to pay hefty fines after major spills,184 these fines rarely have a major
effect on giant oil companies. In fact, just one month after the Pipeline
leaked in Mayflower, the Pipeline leaked again Ripley County, Missouri.185
Class action litigation could be an important check on big industries like oil,
and potential findings of liability could force companies to operate at higher
quality and safety standards – breaking the current cycle of waiting for a spill
to occur and then paying fines.
The fight over pipelines will only increase in intensity moving forward.
To begin shrinking the gap between individual landowners and powerful corporations, courts should give more leeway to class actions pursuing claims of
environmental damage.

VI. CONCLUSION
In Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the Eighth Circuit set in place stringent
requirements for class certification under Dukes while overlooking appropri183. See generally Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d
1130 (11th Cir. 2018); Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018); Ilya Somin, The
Growing Battle Over the Use of Eminent Domain to Take Property for Pipelines,
WASH.
POST
(June
7,
2016),
https://wapo.st/1t67vrU?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.4c4373f10ec4.
184. Timothy Gardner, U.S. Fines Exxon $2.63 Million for Arkansas Oil Pipeline
Leak, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://reut.rs/1YRRD83; Nathan Bomey, BP’s Deepwater Horizon Costs Total $62B, USA TODAY (July 14, 2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/07/14/bp-deepwater-horizoncosts/87087056/.
185. Missouri Oil Spill: Exxon Pegasus Pipeline Leaks Again, One Month After
Mayflower,
Arkansas
Rupture,
HUFFPOST
(May
1,
2013),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/01/missouri-oil-spillexxon_n_3194177.html.
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ate class certification under Rule 23(b)(2). In interpreting the necessity of a
common contention to satisfy commonality, the court held that where a proposed class could establish a similar course of conduct by the defendant,
commonality is not met if class members have suffered different injuries.186
Even where a defendant’s course of conduct involves a physical pipeline running through plaintiffs’ properties, the court held this was insufficient to
show a common contention.187 In its ruling, the Eighth Circuit has created a
nearly impossible bar for class certification, especially in cases of environmental contamination.188
The total effects oil spills have on surrounding land and wildlife is hard
to account for in terms of money, and usually takes years to fully comprehend
the damage. The spill in Mayflower severely impacted nearby wetlands and
the wildlife inhabiting the area,189 and years after the Deepwater Horizon spill
scientists are still attempting to understand how it fundamentally impacted
wildlife in the Gulf of Mexico.190 While oil spills may just be the cost of
doing business in a society so dependent on fossil fuels, the powerful oil industry must be checked from time to time to ensure safe practices and to mitigate the harms spills cause. Moving forward, class litigation should be an
important part of that check in the face of mass environmental contamination.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2017).
See id.
See generally, id.
Miles Grant, As Arkansas Community Reels from Tar Sands Oil Spill, Wildlife Remain in Peril, NAT’L WILDLIFE FOUND. BLOG (Apr. 3, 2013),
https://blog.nwf.org/2013/04/as-arkansas-community-reels-from-tar-sands-oil-spillwildlife-remain-in-peril/.
190. Oliver Milman, Deepwater Horizon Disaster Altered Building Blocks of
Ocean
Life,
GUARDIAN
(June
28,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jun/28/bp-deepwater-horizon-oilspill-report.
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